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THE BIRTH OF POSTWAR AMERICANISM: 
THE ORIGIN OF THE COLD WAR 
n
B Y  J O H N  F R A N C I S  O ’ H A L L O R A N
In West Potomac Park, Washington, D.C., three solitary, lonely stat-ues of American and South Korean soldiers stand in eternal vigi-
lance. There’s an inscription beneath them, in both Korean and
English, displaying the park’s theme as “The Forgotten War.” On a
nearby wall, underneath the known lists of men and women who
fought and died during the Korean conflict, a placard reads, “Free-
dom is not Free.” Just over the wall and down the park’s carefully
kept pathways, a cluster of marble-white soldiers stand forever
frozen in a replicated environment of the Korean War that pillaged
the Korean peninsula with the blood of Koreans and Americans in
1950. One last bronze-casted plaque summates the entire thematic
enterprise of the Korean War, glorifying the American “Sons and
Daughters/ Who Answered the Call/ to Defend a Country/ They
Never Knew/ and A People They Never Met.”1
In an attempt to restore significance to an apparently forgotten
war, the Korean Memorial Park symbolizes two contradictory, yet
quintessential effects of the Korean War. While ‘Forgotten’ by the cur-
rent historiography of the Cold War, the Korean War solidified the
twentieth-century role of an international, militarized America.
From the post-World War II period to nearly the end of the twentieth-
century, a foreign policy of exceptionalism began to manifest itself
in various justified military and economic interventions. A common
trope of this justification originated from a vilified depiction of Com-
munism. The preoccupation with Communism first began with the
United States’ government in the post-World War II period. The gov-
ernment foresaw the threat that Communism posed to United States’
international interests and began to fret over the implications of a
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powerful and global Communist presence. Yet, in post-World War II
America, the general public did not prioritize the international scene
as a direct and existential threat to American domestic interests. The
threat Communism posed to the legitimacy of the United States’
democratic free market society only became synonymous with both
the general public and government at the physical manifestation of
the North Korean invasion of the United States’ trusteeship of South
Korea in 1950. 
In the historiographical tradition of Cold War America, near unan-
imous consensus stated that the American experiences of the Cold
War had severe implications on the domestic rhetoric throughout the
twentieth-century.2 Yet, there has been little unanimity regarding
the specificity of the advent of the Cold War as an American experi-
ence: what this means is that no one can say for certain when the
Cold War began.3 Before propositioning this paper’s theory, it is im-
portant to understand how the history of the Cold War has so far
been comprehended because this paper directly engages with the
Cold War’s historiographical tradition. 
John Fousek, a historian who specializes in American foreign pol-
icy during the twentieth-century, claims the Cold War’s aggression
resulted from the acclaimed moral American victory of World War
II.4 By fighting a ‘good war’ against the evil Nazi Germans, the Ameri-
can postwar mindset began to promote ethical justifications for inter-
national interventionism in the name of morality and ‘just war.’
Fousek argues that, over the course of the Cold War, the public con-
tinually referenced the victorious sentiments of World War II and, in
doing so, spread an ideology legitimizing the need for American in-
terventionism during the Cold War for the ‘good’ of the world. There-
fore, Fousek argues that the Cold War never truly began; rather,
World War II’s recognition of the justified morality of the American
acts of war continued to manifest throughout the Cold War, only with
a different enemy. Properly understanding the Cold War and Korean
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War within the ideological inertia generated from two previously
rhetorically justified World Wars demonstrates how the larger public
discourse so easily acclimatized to the Cold War’s call for a moral
America that had a responsibility to the international arena.
In contrast to Fousek, John Gaddis, a preeminent military histori-
an at Yale University, suggests in The United States and the Origins of
the Cold War, 1941-1947 the Cold War really began in 1945 at the Pots-
dam Conference.5 Conducted at what seemed to be the sure downfall
of the German threat, the purpose of the Conference was to settle on
an agenda for the administrations of the postwar territories of the
Axis powers. Gaddis argues that the personalities of Truman,
Churchill (Atlee after 1945), and Stalin so thoroughly clashed in the
war of wills at the Conference that the inevitable byproduct resulted
in a global petrified stalemate known as the Cold War.6 Therefore, the
Cold War became inevitable and institutionalized at the 1945 Pots-
dam Conference. In 2005, Gaddis, responding to postmodern criti-
cism, wrote Cold War: A New History, in which he recognizes the
importance of the continued domestic legitimatization of the Ameri-
can role in the Cold War.7 Without the public’s legitimatization of the
Cold War, Gaddis argues, the interrelationship between America on
the international stage, and the international Cold War on the Ameri-
can public discourse would not be as severe as historically suggested.
Regardless, the Cold War, Gaddis concludes, as a conceptual advent
of the world divided between the democracies and Communist
states began at the Potsdam Conference in 1945. The public later in-
fused the resulting government’s preoccupation with the interna-
tional threat of Communism. 
These historiographical interpretations offer a foundation to
promulgate this paper’s argument. Fousek’s recognition that the le-
gitimization of the Cold War and the American role within it rose out
of the American public discourse directly contradicts Gaddis’ insis-
tence on the centrality of the role of the government propagating a
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national attitude of anti-Communism.8 However, both overlook a
critical piece of the post-World War II era that complicates their argu-
ments. That is to say, in the immediate aftermath of World War II,
the American public, in general, had no interest in continuing to par-
ticipate on the international arena. The Cold War, therefore, could
not be said to have begun in 1945, as Gaddis argues, because the
American public had not yet conceptualized the idea of a Cold War
and an American role within it. Rather, it took a series of domestic
events, such as the dramatized and publicized trials of Senator Mc-
Carthy and the Supreme Court convictions of US citizens as commu-
nists, in 1949 that culminated in the advent of the Korean War in
1950 to formulate and instill a conceptualization of the Cold War
within the American discourse. 
Beginning in the 1940s, the American economy experienced an
upswing that left the people basking in the comforts of their new-
found material wealth and industrial capabilities.9 At the barest of
glimpses of Census data, it is easy to see how America had become
inoculated against any serious preoccupation with foreign affairs.10
Wages increased triple-fold, with a 178% increase in consumer ex-
penditures, accompanied by a 151.9% increase of the average house-
hold’s income as compared to post-World War I.11 Average family
expenditures increased 120.1% in the new economic prosperity.
Food, clothing and housing accounted for 68.4% of total spending, a
decrease from 1934-1940, signifying the mass profusion of consumer
products in the economy.12 Not only did the dollar have a greater
value, but also the accessibility to consumer goods became seeming-
ly ubiquitous throughout the American culture. To top it all off, there
had been a 10% increase in the population, with a 58% rise in new-
borns as compared to the 1935-1940 period.13 The experience of
wealth and new opportunities, while generally limited to the enjoy-
ment of an exclusive proportion of the population, generated a post-
World War II social attitude of narcissistic optimism. The American
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people became absolutely captivated by the possibility of the fulfill-
ment of their various consumerist aspirations.14 In their search for
the manifestation of their sacrifices during the War, the public re-
garded external affairs as secondary, if at all.
Meanwhile, the American government descended into an anxious
and defensively aggressive posture towards the international com-
munity. The fears of a reoccurrence of totalitarian regimes, like in
Hitler’s Nazi Germany, kept intelligence agencies constantly mobi-
lized. This prolonged hyperextension resulted in a paranoid state,
fearful of the any suggestion of illiberal movements on the interna-
tional stage. Reflections on the previous two wars within governmen-
tal agencies brought about a somewhat timid consensus that misery,
destruction and ruin necessarily created the appropriate ingredients
for authoritarianism and militant fascism. A 1947 Department of
State Policy Planning Staff meeting’s minutes demonstrates such a
belief. The memo suggests how any
further deterioration might be disastrous to Europe. It
might well bring such hardship, such bewilderment, such
desperate struggle for control over inadequate resources
as to lead to widespread repudiation of the principles on
which modern European civilization has been founded
and for which, in the minds of many, two world wars
have been fought… United States interests could not fail
to be profoundly affected by such a trend of events.15
The ‘desperate struggle’ for simple basic necessities like food, shelter
and water underlined the belief that an unstable European continent
would necessarily lead to the resurgence of another fascist or author-
itarian leader.16 These thoughts were not unfounded beliefs, for the
rise of Hitler came about with the campaign promise to restore a
German dignity, pride, and, most importantly, reestablish a stable
society.17 Therefore, the State Department believed European post-
war destruction increased the chances of another Nazi Germany or
Mussolini Italy. Without American intervention, such a fatalistic pre-
diction could become a reality. This speculation generated a sense of
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global stewardship in the minds and policies of United States’ bu-
reaucracy. 
For example, National Security Council Memo #68 (NSC68), writ-
ten in 1950, demonstrates the government’s belief in the American
economy to save Europe.18 The American industrial strength has the
potency, NSC68 argued, to support the fledging European states. In
doing so, the inherent attractiveness of dictatorial regimes and Com-
munism came into question. By lending funds, machinery, and sub-
sidizing the rebuilding of general infrastructure, outlined within
NSC68, the National Security Council hoped to entice the devastated
populations with the superiority of democratic governance and capi-
talist free market economies. By restoring a modicum of stability to
the society, American assistance could reverse the disparity that
pushed the population to seek extreme leftist solutions, as it had in
both World War I and II, as well as in the Bolshevik Revolution of
1908. As such, NSC68 demonstrates how the government believed it
had a direct role in the sustaining and propagating the international
democratic order.
NSC68 demonstrates the government’s belief that the internation-
al war against Communism could be fought with simple means such
as economic loans, industrial recovery programs, and, most interest-
ingly, food programs.19 Indeed, an official War Department memo in
1946 recorded an open hostility and barely-concealed anxiety in the
American government at the presence of neighboring Soviet territo-
ries.20 On March 17th 1951, the Digest of the Office of Current Infor-
mation, a daily communiqué that relayed critical news updates
throughout the Central Intelligence Agency, worried over the trade
relations between India and China. Even though an expected deliv-
ery of two million tons of US wheat was scheduled for the next year,
13,100 tons of Communist Chinese rice already reached India, with
two more shipments on their way.21 A tone of impatience, worry and
a concluding call for expedited attention to the seriousness of being
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outpaced by the Communists ran throughout the communiqué. 
Throughout the post-War World II era, President Truman made
numerous appeals to the American Congress and its people to help
overwhelmed states preserve their sociopolitical integrity from illib-
eral revolutions.22 In 1947, President Truman stood before the 79th
Joint Congressional Session to ask for appropriations to intervene on
behalf of the besieged states of Greece and Turkey. The purpose of
the funds, Truman suggested, would be to give Greece and Turkey
the opportunity “to work out their own destinies in their own way.”
President Truman came to the conclusion that because “there is no
other country to which democratic Greece can turn,” the political
solidarity and duty to “keep…hope alive” fell to America, its people
and leaders.23 The famous example of this new American ulterior ‘al-
truism’ came to be known as the Marshall Plan, which funneled 44.8
billion US dollars into loans and rebuilding programs, with over 85%
of the loan targeting areas in Europe from its start of 1948 till 1953.24
The Marshall Plan and the internal departmental communications
demonstrate the United States’ belief in the necessity of taking
proactive, interventionist, and international steps in the name of
democracy. 
However, with World War II officially over, the public reverted
back to an isolationistic attitude, unsympathetic to the pleas of dev-
astated postwar states. The government’s role as a global American
savior failed to register within the public in the immediate postwar
period. In fact, pressured by businessmen and corporations to lower
taxes, Congress severely restricted the fiscal budget, specifically tar-
geting the military budget as revealed in Appendix I.25 Instead, at the
demand of its constituency, federal tax dollars were shuffled and in-
terchanged in the Revenue Acts of 1945 and 1948 in the interest of
reducing taxes in both the corporate and individual interests. This
had the effect of severely restricting the previous wartime govern-
ment’s powers.26 Rather than expanding power in a manner that was
146
N O RT H W E S T  PA S S AG E S
7
O'Halloran: The Birth of Postwar Americanism: The Origin of the Cold War
Published by Pilot Scholars, 2014
conducive to waging a global war, the American government’s capa-
bilities were restricted and limited in the postwar period at the de-
mand of the public in the interest of domestic pursuits. This suggests
that the conventionalization of the Cold War in the postwar public
discourse had not yet taken root.
In fact, Gallup Polls conducted at this time registered a public ap-
peal for the government to fulfill the public’s World War II sacrifices
by making accessible a variety of consumer products. For example,
98% of American cities denoted a shortage of available housing from
1945 to 1946. Petitions for redress of this shortfall requested the gov-
ernment’s assistance in helping the public realize their dreams of
owning their own home.27 Furthermore, consumer products, like
houses, tallied in Gallup Polls as the foremost concern on the Ameri-
can mind.28 In fact, U.S. foreign policy never surpassed the fifth posi-
tion from 1946 to 1949 according to Gallup Polls.29 It is illuminating
how, even though 85% of the American public knew of the Chinese
Civil War, a little over half of those said that the United States no
longer had a role or responsibility in the matter.30 Additionally, even
though there was wide support in the creation of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), the idea that the United States would
find itself in another war within the next ten years did not resonate
with the majority of the American population.31 In these examples,
the United States’ public interest never wandered outside of their
pursuits at home. Instead, they remained firmly fixed within the do-
mestic sphere.32
Yet, a series of subsequent events from the end of 1949 to 1950 in-
spired fear and paranoia that synched the public’s mindset to a simi-
lar militarized attitude of their hawkish government. These events
were heard, read and followed by every American through the in-
tense attention devoted by various news media outlets. For example,
in August 1949, the New York Times confirmed that the Soviets had
detonated their own atomic bomb.33 Throughout the following
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months, the media worked to calm the growing panic in the public,
by publishing articles like ‘US Plans Unaltered Despite Soviet Deno-
tation.’34 In this article, the government announced that measures
had been planned for a Soviet nuclear arsenal, but in order to keep
ahead of the Soviets, “more steam must be put on” to indemnify
American security and stability in their dominance.35 Not a month af-
terwards, on October 1, 1949 Mao Zedong christened China as the
People’s Republic of China, and by May of 1950, the Chinese Com-
munists overran the last nationalist stronghold in the Hainan Is-
lands.36 These two events quite vividly put the idea of a powerful
enemy, antagonistic to American interests, in the center of the
American mind. 
Furthermore, in October 1949, eleven members of the American
Communist party were convicted in the United States Supreme
Court for insurrection and treason in a conspiracy of a violent Com-
munist insurrection in the United States.37 Again, on January 21,
1950, Alger Hiss, a high-ranking State Department official, received a
five-year sentence for conspiracy and collaboration with Communist
intentions.38 To top it all off, Senator McCarthy’s Chairmanship on
the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and the House Un-
American Committee (HUAC) brought forth a total of 653 people for
investigations into acclaimed subversive actions and intent.39 From
the Lavender Scare to the Red Scare, the wild accusations of the
HUAC inspired an atmosphere of fear and distrust throughout the
government and public.40 Quite suddenly, from a removed threat of a
Soviet nuclear bomb and a remote, primitive culture as the Chinese,
the Communist specter became a palpable existence not only sur-
rounding America, but also within the very walls of society itself.41
The rhetoric of an international competition with the Soviets and a
claim of an increased wariness of the Chinese decisively warped into
a demand for a governmental guarantee of the public stability and
safety, not only on an international scale, but also within the domes-
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tic context. 
On June 25, 1950, the North Korean army invaded the United
States protectorate of South Korea. That same day, President Truman
appealed to both the people and to Congress for a fully militarized re-
sponse. Only this time, in his rhetoric, Truman depicted the threat
that Communism posed in direct opposition to the self-interests of
the United States, international stability, and global democratic legit-
imacy.42 President Truman concluded his speech to Congress by cry-
ing, 
Our country stands before the world as an example of
how free men, under God, can build a community of
neighbors, working together for the good of all. That is the
goal we seek not only for ourselves, but for all people.43
President Truman provoked an intense imagery of America as not
just a successful icon of freedom, capitalism and Western society, but
also an America that was universally attractive.44 The underlying
principles of Truman’s exceptionalism seemingly demanded global
actualization. The Korean War and its immediate context of the pub-
lic’s heightened trepidation gave the United States’ government the
legitimacy to fully reengage with the threat of Communism on an in-
ternational stage in the name of defense and the pursuit of the na-
tion’s self-interest.45 The guarantee of stability and security that the
public had been looking for since the events of the previous year
found a resonation with the President’s declaration of war. However,
the declaration of war wasn’t just in the name of South Korean
democracy, and by extension global democracy, but also against the
Communist aggression wherever it was to be found. This declaration
of war demonstrates a beginning conception of American global re-
sponsibility for democratic principles and democracies. As such the
genesis of American Cold War sensibilities took place within the con-
text of the American rhetoric of ethical interventionism of the Kore-
an War. 
On June 29, 1950, a few days after the American military formal-
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ized against the North Korean invasion, approximately 675 con-
stituent telegrams and letters were received at the White House. A
Presidential memo indicates that 525 of 675 telegrams and letters re-
sponded favorably to the President’s actions in authorizing General
Douglas MacArthur to respond to the North Korean invasion with
armed force.46 However, the public’s perception of what the war
meant in these communications had profound implications. One let-
ter of this vast collection foresaw the intent of the Korean War “to
deter the Russians from attacking anywhere else in the world”; the
letter’s author, Mrs. Whitman, as portrayed in Appendix II, suggests
a preemptive strategy by having “complete mobilization now”
against all forms of Communist aggression.47 Mrs. Whitman’s letter is
typical in expressing approval of the new international role of Amer-
ica and its purpose in the global stage. For months after the United
States entered the war in Korea, as John Fousek argues, “public opin-
ion polls showed high levels of support for the administration’s de-
fense buildup; they also suggest that most Americans viewed the
Korean situation in global terms.”48 The social and political shift in
priorities, from internal domestic concerns of housing and the like,
to the demand of supremacy of an American democracy reflects a
broad foundation of public support for the war against the North Ko-
reans and the Soviet-inspired, global Communist aggression. The Ko-
rean War and its surrounding context provided enough momentum
to distract the public from their immediate self-interests to prioritize
the threat posed by Communism. 
Literature, music and movies from the 1950s succinctly demon-
strate this shift. In literature, pulp fiction metaphorically presented
the Communist ‘enemy’ and American ‘savior.’ For example, as ex-
hibited in Appendix III, the Korean soldier in the backdrop of the
cover page of The Naked and the Lost, by Franklin M. Davis and pub-
lished in 1952, represents a villainous Communist archetype.49 A
naked, white, young woman stands to the side, hiding behind the
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door; a white, middle-aged man in the center of the title appears to
tense in preparation for defending the woman and fighting the Kore-
an.50 By holding a pistol, it seems the American will use armed de-
fense in order to save the dignity of the vulnerable female. 51 As only
one example of many, The Naked and the Lost exemplifies the mani-
festation of Cold War rhetoric through the context of the Korean War
within the literature genus. While it’s unknown to the extent these
types of fiction were consumed, an induction from this title page
suggests that the symbolic personification of the Cold War took on an
idealization of America as a defender against a Communist aggressor. 
Country music witnessed a similar transition to romanticizing the
patriotism of an international America, demonstrating a shift in the
conceptualization of the Korean War and the principles behind the
war. Singers like Harry Choates, Elton Britt, and Wilif Carter sang
lyrics laced with a glorification of inherent American political and
social superiority.52 On January 24, 1952, Carter sang, Good-Bye
Maria (I’m Off to Korea). A lyric in Good-Bye Maria reads, “It’s the
same old story and it’s up to Old Glory/ To win another fight for lib-
erty.”53 Carter’s lyrics directly correlate the moral duty of America,
personified by Carter as ‘Old Glory,’ to an American responsibility
for the promotion of democracy. Resonations of American involve-
ment in World War II also reverberate in Carter’s lyrics by comparing
the ‘same old story’ of World War II in 1945 to the new war in Korea.
Seen through Carter’s lyrical composition, country music during the
1950s makes unmistakable parallels between the future of democra-
cy and the role of an international America.54 The thematic tropes in
the 1950s country music genre positively sentimentalized the associ-
ation of an American role in defending democracy on an interna-
tional stage.55
In his article “Reluctant Crusaders,” Lary May, a historian at the
University of Minnesota who specializes in the visual culture of the
early Cold War era, discusses the patriotic cinematography of the
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1950s. May states that the patriotism displayed in the cinema during
the 1950s was designed between the government and Hollywood
producers. May argues that government leaders “saw the mass arts
as a vehicle not to reflect group life, but to recreate American myths
and symbols.”56 As a prime example, in 1951, President Truman
praised Hollywood during a meeting with producers and his top cabi-
net members, saying, “no organization in the world can make a bet-
ter contribution to [constructing] truth than yours.”57 The creation of
over thirty-five Korean War films from 1950 to 1960 converged with
government and Hollywood efforts to build a postwar consensus of
American identity or, as President Truman called it, the construction
of ‘truth.’ The Korean War, May continues, “provided a golden oppor-
tunity… to promote to a wider audience, the call for containment at
home and abroad,” and to assume “a global role as a model of liberal
capitalism and defender of the world from Communism.”58 Through
the consumption of visual depictions of good (America) versus evil
(Communists) in the cinema during the Korean War, like in music
and fiction, government officials hoped the public would rally be-
hind a patriotic message of an international America.59
The appearance of nationalistic movies, literature and music in
the 1950s indicates a distinctive change in the public discourse as
compared to only a few years before.60 From 1945 to 1949, the Ameri-
can experience of postwar economic abundance disengaged the pub-
lic’s prioritization from the international scene. The Cold War could
not have begun before the 1950s because the concept of an interna-
tional America with a moral obligation to the world for the continual
preservation of democracy did not exist within the public rhetoric at
the time. Instead, the public’s attention fixated on the realization of
their consumerist aspirations. However, the government’s distress of
a third World War arising from the postwar ashes led to a far earlier
bureaucratic preoccupation on the international stage. The interde-
partmental dialogues from the State Department and National Secu-
152
N O RT H W E S T  PA S S AG E S
13
O'Halloran: The Birth of Postwar Americanism: The Origin of the Cold War
Published by Pilot Scholars, 2014
rity Council demonstrate the perceived belief in the correlation be-
tween the prevalence of Communism in ravaged states and the con-
sequential discrediting of democracy and free market societies. As a
result, the government struggled to evolve into a role where it could
combat the Communist spread through various economic and mili-
tary means when its public had no interest in following suit. 
It took the physical invasion of Communist forces, depicted as the
North Koreans, on a United States’ South Korean protectorate, to cre-
ate the public and government’s consonance on the threat of Com-
munism. As a result, the public legitimized the government’s
compulsion for a role on the international stage. The constituent let-
ters received at the White House, the indicative voting records regis-
tered through the Gallup Polls, and the emergence of jingoistic
music, literature and cinematography substantiate the public’s shift
in priorities. The synching between the government and public’s
fear of Communism generated what the historiography of twentieth-
century America calls the Cold War. 
Therefore, John Gaddis and John Fousek are correct in assuming
that significant inertia for the Cold War psyche originated from
World War II and its era. However, they do not consider the effects of
war weariness on the American public in the immediate postwar
years. Undoubtedly, as Gaddis argues, the Potsdam Conference of
1945 had severe repercussions in systematizing the international
geopolitical arena for the coming Cold War. Similarly, according to
Fousek, the morality of a ‘just war,’ like that of the American role dur-
ing World War II, continued to justify future American interventions.
However, neither of these explanations account for the postwar pub-
lic fixation on domesticity from 1945-1949. The advent of the Korean
War and the analysis presented in this paper reveal the significance
of the events of the early 1950s for creating the accordance between
the public and the government in the threat of international Com-
munism. By presenting the ‘Forgotten War’ as the nucleus event in
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the genesis of the Cold War, the Korean War regains its due reputa-
tion in the historiography of Cold War America. 
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